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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal isfroma final order of the Utah Labor Commission. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(8)(a); 63G-4403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a). Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies
available at law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE
Whether the Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error
when she failed to resolve all conflicts in the evidence.
Standard of review: The application of the law by the Labor Commission
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998).
ISSUE TWO
Whether the Administrative Law Judge committed reversible error when she failed
to make the requisite findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was possible.
Standard of review: The application of the law by the Labor Commission
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, RULES, OR
CONSTITUTIONS
ISSUE ONE
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv);
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413; and
Utah Admin. CodeR. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e).
ISSUE TWO
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i);
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413; and
Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 14, 2005, respondent filed an Application for Hearing on the issues
of medical expenses, recommended medical care and permanent total disability
compensation. Petitionersfiledtheir response on December 28, 2005. On May 15, 2006,
a hearing was held on respondent's application for hearing. And, on January 5, 2007,
Administrative Law Judge Deidre Marlowe issued her Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law; Award of Subsistence Benefits. ALJ Marlowe found that respondent had
suffered an accident while in the course and scope of his employment. She also held that
respondent's lumbar conditions were medically causally connected to the industrial
accident. Last, she found that respondent was unable to perform basic work activities as
evinced by his limitations and need for time off. However, the ALJ failed to specifically
identify what these limitations were for respondent.
On February 6, 2007, petitioners filed a letter indicating their intent to file a
rehabilitation plan. And, on April 26, 2007, petitioners filed a reemployment plan.
Respondent objected to the plan and an evidentiary hearing was held on May 16, 2007.
On September 3, 2007, ALJ Marlowe issued her Order of Permanent and Total
Disability. She found that petitioners' reemployment plan did not meet the restrictions or
needs of the respondent and that the plan was not reasonably designed to return him to
gainful employment.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on
October 3, 2007 and Brief in Support of Motion for Review on October 24, 2007.
Respondent replied on October 23? 2007. And, on August 31, 2010, the Labor
Commission issued an Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. The Labor Commission denied
petitioners' argument that ALJ Marlowe's preliminary decision provided insufficient
guidance to allow for preparation of a reemployment plan.
Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals on
September 30, 2010, for review of the entire Order of the Commission.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Respondent Stewart Seely (petitioner below before the Labor Commission) was
employed as an x-ray technician at St. Mark's Hospital in 1988. In 1999, he transferred
to Timpanogas Regional Hospital. Respondent suffered an initial injury to his low back
in 1996 when he lifted a 5 gallon container at St. Mark's Hospital. On October 19,1996,
Dr. Bradley Noblett performed a left L3-4 hemilaminectomy and discectomy.
Respondent had continued complaints of back pain and left calf numbness. Dr. Joel Dall
provided claimant a 10% whole person impairment rating on August 28, 1997. On
February 23, 2000, respondent was helping transfer an ICU patientfromthe x-ray table to
the ICU bed when he pulled his back. Respondent alleges that the patient weighed
between 250 and 300 pounds.
An MRI taken on March 29, 2000, showed a disc herniation at L4-5 with some
effect upon the nerve root. An L4-5 discectomy and never root decompression was

performed on July 7,2000 by Dr. Lynn Gaufm. On November 10, 2000, a
decompression at L4-5 and a pedicle screw fixation was performed. Dr. Gaufm stated
that respondent could return to work in the light to medium duty category. He also stated
that a 35 pound lifting restriction would be ideal.
In 2002, Dr. Jeffrey Chung examined the respondent and stated that he could
return to work, however, he recommended that respondent have restrictions of no lifting,
pushing, or pulling with greater than 30 pounds of force. In 2003, Dr. Chung provided
another statement on restrictions stating that respondent could work with 30-50 pound
lifting restrictions. And, on July 28, 2003, Dr. Chung stated that claimant should not lift
more than 50 pounds nor more than 25 pounds on a regular basis.
On November 15, 2002, respondent took an overdose of his prescription pills and
he was admitted to the emergency. As a result of his actions, respondent was required to
see a psychologist. And on May 3, 2003, respondent's employment with Timpanogas
Regional Hospital was terminated as a result of stolen narcotics. Respondent stated that
he sought employment as an x-ray technician after his termination, but was told he would
not be considered until his workers' compensation case was finished.
Respondent was seen by Dr. Junius Clawson who recommended that respondent
abide by a 50 pound lifting restriction. In 2004, Dr. Gaufm stated that respondent's
advance degeneration would make it difficult for him to return to work.
On December 14, 2005, Dr. Dall assigned respondent a 13% impairment rating in
addition to the 10% impairment rating assigned for the 1996 back injury. It was Dr.
DalPs opinion that medical management had not been optimized. And, in 2006, Dr.

Chung agreed with Dr. Dall regarding respondent's impairment rating and stated that
respondent could return to work with a maximum lift restriction of 35 pounds.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible clear error when she failed to
resolve all conflicts in the evidence.

II.

The Administrative Law Judge committed reversible error when she failed to
make the requisite findings regarding whether successful rehabilitation was
possible.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN THE CONFLICTS IN THE EVIDENCE REGARDING
RESPONDENT'S WORK RESTRICTIONS WERE NOT RESOLVED.
The Utah Labor Commission, through the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter

"ALJ") and Appeals Board, erred by failing to resolve the conflicts in the evidence
regarding respondent's work restrictions. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i); 34A2-413; Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(l),(6); Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e). The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued on January 5, 2007 contain numerous
inconsistencies and various different medical restrictions all of which are supported by
medical opinions. The ALJ made reference to the various restrictions but failed to
provide any sort of resolution. As a result, petitioners were not able to properly draft a
reemployment plan because it was unclear which set of restrictions actually applied to the
respondent.

The court has held that "[i]t is the province of the Board, not appellate courts, to
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawnfromthe
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Carter v. Labor Com'n
Appeals Board, 153 P.3d 763, 767 (Utah App. 2006). Here, the ALJ failed to resolve the
inconsistencies and even cited to them in her order. The January 5, 2007 provides the
following conflicting restrictions:
1) "Dr. Chung indicted that Petitioner may perform job in the light to moderate
categories of work - he should not lift greater than 50 pounds nor 25 pounds
repeatedly."
2) "On January 20, 2004 the Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Junius Clawson,
who recommended a lifting restriction of 50 lbs."
3) "Dr. Chung noted in March of 2002 that claimant could return to work with
"no lifting, pushing or pulling with greater than 30 pounds of force."
4) "Dr. Gaufin opined that the Petitioner could not return to work with the
advanced degeneration in his back."
5) Dr. Gordan George noted that the Petitioner reported he could sit/stand for 30
minutes at a time.
6) Dr. Chung indicated on May 3, 2006 that the Petitioner had a maximum lift of
35 pounds and was not capable of transferring bedridden or wheelchair patients
as he used to do.
7) Dr. Gaufm indicated that claimant may be able to work "in light to medium
category work."

These restrictions provide little guidance for petitioners when drafting their
reemployment plan. In one order, the restrictions range from an inability to return to
work to a 50 pound lifting restriction. Such a gap is huge and provides an explanation as
to why the ALJ found that the "reemployment plan submitted by Respondents does not
meet the restrictions or needs of the Petitioner." The ALJ had an obligation to resolve
the conflicts in the evidence regarding respondent's restrictions so that a comprehensive
and reasonable reemployment plan could be submitted for consideration. As a result of
the ALJ's failure, petitioners were denied the opportunity to submit a plan that was
reasonably designed to return respondent to gainful employment.
If the ALJ considered one set of restrictions controlling, her orders provided no
direction. As noted above, references were made to various restrictions which were
supported by medical evidence. The ALJ did not suggest that the opinions of one
physician should be considered more than the opinions of any of the other physicians.
She also made no mention as to whether or not the most recent restrictions should be
given more weight. If recency was given the most weight, then petitioners'
reemployment plan could have been designed around a 35 pound lifting restriction.
However, no such guidance was implicitly or explicitly provided.
The importance of the ALJ reaching a conclusion on the medical restrictions and
the reemployment plan following those restrictions was recently detailed by the Court of
Appeals of Utah as follows:
"According to the June 14,2000 order, the plan was defective because the
physical work restrictions . . . contained in the [rehabilitation plan] were materially

different than those specified by Dr. Smith and referred to in the August 1998
order awarding permanent total disability benefits."
Color Country Management v. Labor Comm'n, 38 P.3d 969, 973-4 (Utah App. 2001). In
Color Country Management the court held that respondent's reemployment plan was
defective because it failed to provide subsistence benefits and because the work
restrictions contained in the plan were not similar to those provided in the ALJ's order
awarding permanent total disability benefits. Id.
The ALJ's conclusions regarding respondent's restrictions further supports
petitioners' argument that there was a failure to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence.
The January 5, 2007, order states that".. .Petitioner is 58 years old, has a high school
diploma and has lifting restrictions as well as sit/stand restrictions..." And, in the
September 3, 2007 order, after finding that the petitioners' reemployment did not
consider respondent's restrictions, the ALJ concluded that the respondent had
"significant sit/stand restrictions."
As a result of the numerous restrictions and the lack of information regarding
which restrictions the ALJ considered controlling, it is easy to see why the petitioners
were unable to determine which of these restrictions were applicable. The ALJ should
not have been able to conclude that rehabilitation was not possible without resolution of
the medical restriction issue. Specifically, the ALJ denied the reemployment plan by
finding that "with regard to the jobs identified, there is no indication of what weight and
frequencies the petitioner would be able to lift." Accordingly, petitioners request that
this matter be remanded for determination of the medical restrictions issue so that

petitioners are given the opportunity to craft a specific rehabilitation plan for respondent
that coincides with his restrictions.
II.

THE ADMmSTRATTVE LAW JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDINGS
REGARDING WHETHER REHABILITATION WAS POSSIBLE.
Until an ALJ reviews the reemployment plan and activities, a finding of

permanent total disability is not final. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)
states that:
"the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing.. .to
consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment
plan.. .If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is
not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that employee be paid
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits."
The ALJ could not have properly determined that the respondent was permanently and
totally disabled because there were nofindingsmade regarding what restrictions were
preventing respondent from returning to gainful employment. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413; Utah Admin. Code R. 612-1-10(C)(1). Further, the ALJ made no determination
regarding whether rehabilitation was possible. The order of permanent and total
disability only states that petitioners' reemployment plan did not meet the restrictions or
needs of the respondent.
The statute asks the Commission to determine if other work is reasonably
available, "taking into consideration the employee's[ ]... age;... education;... past work

experience;... medical capacity; and... residual functional capacity." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus, 164 P.3d 384, 393 (Utah 2007). And, the Court of Appeals has held that:
"In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the
findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.... The failure of an agency to make adequatefindingsof fact on material
issues renders its findings arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear,
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion."
Strate v. Labor Com'n, 136 P.3d 1273, 1276 (Utah App. 2006).
In the case at bar, the evidence is not clear or uncontroverted. The evidence
presented suggests that there are numerous interpretations which could be madefromthe
restrictions before the ALJ. Despite these inconsistencies, the ALJ erroneously found
that the reemployment plan was not designed to return the petitioner to gainful
employment rather than determining whether successful rehabilitation was possible.
Further, there were no findings made to support the conclusion that respondent
was permanently and totally disabled except for the brief finding where the ALJ
determines that the respondent has "significant sit/stand restrictions". There is
significant evidence, including the various opinions of numerous physicians, showing
that respondent could be returned to work within certain restrictions. Instead of making
the requisite findings, the ALJ erroneously held that the reemployment plan was not
reasonably designed to return the respondent to gainful employment. Without proper
resolution of the medical restrictions issue, petitioners could not submit a meaningful
rehabilitation plan and the ALJ cannot reach a proper conclusion regarding whether
successful rehabilitation is possible.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the final
order of the Labor Commission, below as an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious,
and not supported by substantial evidence, and remand for such other proceedings as
necessary.
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ADDENDUM
A.

Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, orders, jury instructions.
None.

B.

Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as
contracts or other documents.
None.

C.

Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv): "The appellate court shall grant relief

only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: the agency action is: (i)
an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; (ii) contrary to a rule of the
agency; (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious."
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence;fraud,etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect;

"

Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): "(4) The appellate court shall grant relief
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:.. . (g) the agency
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;...."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413: (1) (a) In the case of a permanent total disability
resulting from an industrial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive
compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee
must prove by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as
a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent
total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease is the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for
which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or
occupational disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim;
and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into
consideration the employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and

(E) residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those
provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(e) In determining under Subsections (l)(b) and (c) whether an employee cannot
perform other work reasonably available, the following may not be considered:
(i) whether the employee is incarcerated in a facility operated by or contracting with a
federal, state, county, or municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a
secure or nonsecure setting; or
(ii) whether the employee is not legally eligible to be employed because of a reason
unrelated to the impairment or combination of impairments.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week
entitlement, compensation is 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time
of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury;
(b) (i) subject to Subsection (2)(b)(ii), compensation per week may not be less than the
sum of $45 per week and:
(A) $5 for a dependent spouse; and
(B) $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four
dependent minor children; and
(ii) the amount calculated under Subsection (2)(b)(i) may not exceed:
(A) the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a); or
(B) the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under
Subsection (2)(b) is 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest
dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of
permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in
effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall for an overpayment of compensation
described in Subsection (3)(b), reimburse the overpayment:

(i) to the employer or its insurance carrier; and
(ii) out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee receives compensation from the employee's employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent
total disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the
employer or its insurance carrier satisfies its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section
34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability
compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for
any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier may recoup the overpayment of
compensation described in Subsection (4) by reasonably offsetting the overpayment
against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities
undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8a, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless
otherwise stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier
under Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (5)(a), the
administrative law judge shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for
the employee's subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in
Subsection (5)(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.

(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability
payments made under Subsection (5)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation
liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment
plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject
to Subsections (5)(e)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include, but not require an employee to pay for:
(A) retraining;
(B) education;
(C) medical and disability compensation benefits;
(D) job placement services; or
(E) incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment
plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment
plan is cause for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(g) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that pursuant to a reemployment plan, as
prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider and presented under Subsection (5)(e), an
employee could immediately or without unreasonable delay return to work but for the
following, an administrative law judge shall order that the employee be denied the
payment of weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits:
(i) incarceration in a facility operated by or contracting with a federal, state, county, or
municipal government to house a criminal offender in either a secure or nonsecure
setting; or
(ii) not being legally eligible to be employed because of a reason unrelated to the
impairment or combination of impairments.
(6) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on
the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently
totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job
earning at least minimum wage, except that the employee may not be required to accept
the work to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from Social Security
disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall:

(i) fully cooperate in the placement and employment process; and
(ii) accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the
work provided under Subsection (6)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the
employee's income in excess of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work
subject to the offset provisions of Subsection (6)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset,
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (6) is governed by Part
8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier has the burden of proof to show that
medically appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any work:
(A) that would require the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's:
(I) medical capacity; or
(II) residual functional capacity; or
(B) for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability
benefits as provided in Subsection (6)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, parttime work is offered, but the employee fails to fully cooperate.
(7) When an employee is rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial
disability.
(8) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to
disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or
reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The
administrative law judge shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an
employee if the administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate,
unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the record justifying
dismissal with prejudice.
(9) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of the following constitutes
total and permanent disability that is compensated according to this section:
(i) both hands;
(ii) both arms;
(iii) both feet;
(iv) both legs;
(v) both eyes; or
(vi) any combination of two body members described in this Subsection (9)(a).
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (9)(a) is final.

(10) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent
total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (9), for which the insurer or selfinsured employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the employee
remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an
award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to
allow morefrequentreexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to one or more reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to one or more reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and
retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of one or more sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved
by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and
per diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in
supporting the employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of
reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a
permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension
of the employee's permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with
the reexamination.
(f) (i) If the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveals evidence that
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total
disability compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the
Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The insurer or self-insured
employer shall include with the petition, documentation supporting the insurer's or selfinsured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (10)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined
by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at
a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work
may not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability
entitlement, but the evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate,
part-time work under Subsection (6) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing
with other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition.

Utah Admin. Code R. 612-l-10(C)(l)(2)(e): C. For permanent total disability
claims arising on or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a two-step
adjudicative process. First, the Commission must make a preliminary determination
whether the applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so, the Commission will
proceed to the second step, in which the Commission will determine whether the
applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On receipt
of an application for permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudication
Division will assign an Administrative Law Judge to conduct evidentiary
proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet each of the
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(l)(b) and (c).
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the elements set forth in
Subsections 34A-2- 413(l)(b) and (c), the ALJ will issue a preliminary determination
of permanent total disability and shall order the employer or insurance carrier to pay
permanent total disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the
second step of the adjudication process. The payment of permanent total disability
compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination shall commence as of the date
established by the preliminary determination and shall continue until otherwise
ordered.
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary determination may obtain
additional agency review by either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-801(3). If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's
preliminary determination is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals
Board, no further adjudicative or enforcement proceedings shall take place pending
the decision of the Commissioner or Board.
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total disability by the Labor
Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate
judicial review.
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the Appeals Board or an
appellate court, an appeal of the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's preliminary
determination of permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of
"second step" proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent total disability
compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination.
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant a request for stay if the
requesting party has filed a petition for judicial review and the Commissioner or
Appeals Board determine that:
(i) the requesting party has a substantial possibility of prevailing on the merits;
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable injury unless a stay is granted; and
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to other parties to the proceeding.

2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2413(6), if the first step of the adjudicatory process results in a preliminary finding of
permanent total disability, an additional inquiry must be made into the applicant's
ability to be reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional
proceedings.
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether the applicant can be
reemployed or rehabilitated.
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a summary of reemployment
activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a reemployment plan meeting
the requirements set forth in Subsection 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2413(6)(d)(i) through (hi).
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b) the employer or insurance carrier may
not be required to pay disability compensation for any combination of disabilities of
any kind in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks
at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate.
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may be recouped by the employer
or insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability
paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide for the employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject to the provisions of
Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above, but can be funded
by reasonably offsetting the advance of disability compensation against future
liability normally paid after the initial 312 weeks.
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation to provide for an employee's
subsistence during the rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of future weekly
disability compensation payments may be discounted from the future to the present
to accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, the employer or insurance
carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts paid against future liability
payable after the initial 312 weeks. In this process, care should be exercised to
reasonably minimize adversefinancialimpact on the employee.
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the reasonableness of any proposed
offset, the matter may be submitted to an ALJ for determination.
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413(7) and (9) require the applicant to fully cooperate in
any evaluation or reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in dismissal of the
applicant's claim or reduction or elimination of benefit payments including disability
compensation and subsistence allowance amounts, consistent with the provisions of
Section 34A-2-413(7) and (9).

(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer or its insurance carrier to
diligently pursue any proffered reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in a
final award of permanent total disability compensation to the applicant.
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second step" proceeding, the ALJ
concludes that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a final
order for continuing payment of permanent total disability compensation. The period
for payment of such compensation shall be commence on the date the employee
became permanently and totally disabled, as determined by the ALJ.
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" proceeding, the ALJ
concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible, the ALJ
shall enter a final order to that effect, which order shall contain such direction to the
parties as the ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and
continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary under the
particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order shall provide for
reasonable offset of payments of any disability compensation that constitute an
overpayment under Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b).
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and judicial review provided
by law.
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if
such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimant's
community would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is
within the distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the
claimant was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect.
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